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IMMIGRATION REFORM - PROVISIONS IN THE PROPOSED IMMI-
GRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1985 PERMITTING THE USE
OF TEMPORARY FOREIGN WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES - IM-
PORTING LABOR FROM MEXICO
"[T]he search for perfection leads nowhere. On this problem as
on others the best is the enemy of the good."1
The United States Senate on September 19, 1985 passed legisla-
tion that would punish employers who hire illegal aliens but at the
same time would increase the number of legal nonimmigrant work-
ers available to farmers.2 Many United States farmers depefid on
illegal alien labor to produce crops.3 The Senate bill and its com-
panion bill, introduced in the House of Representatives on July 25,
1985,' both contain employer sanctions5 and amnesty provisions6
that would end that source of labor.7
I Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 1510 Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1983) (reprint of The Best Versus the Good, the Boston
Globe, Dec. 29, 1982, (quoting Rep. Romano L. Mazzoli) [hereinafter cited as IRILI.
' The Senate bill, S. 1200, is entitled the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1985.
The text of the bill as passed appears at 131 CONG. REc. 811,750 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1985). A
companion bill was introduced in the House of Representatives on July 25, 1985, by Repre-
sentatives Peter W, Rodino (D. N.J.) and Romano L. Mazzoli (D. Ky.). H.R. 3080, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. H6392 (daily ed. July 26, 1985) [hereinafter cited as House
Version].
' Sen. Simpson, The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982 (March 17, 1982) (un-
published statement).
' S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 122, 131 CONG. REc. S11,753 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1985)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Version]. S. 1200 would impose civil fines of up to $10,000 for
each violation, as well as criminal fines, on employers who engage in a pattern of hiring
illegal aliens. Id. (Part C, 121) House Version, supra note 2, at 8-10. The bill would punish
those who transport illegal aliens into the United States with fines and prison sentences of
up to one year for first offenders and up to five years for repeated offenders. Id. at 35. S.
1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 122, 131 CONG. REC. S11,751 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1985).
S. 1200 would legalize aliens who have been in the United States since before January 1,
1980. Legalization would begin three years after enactment, or sooner if a commission deter-
mined that employer sanctions and increased border patrols had curbed the flow of illegal
aliens into the country. Senate Version, supra note 4 at S11,761 (Title II, 201). H.R. 3080
provides for legalization 180 days after enactment for aliens who have continuously resided
in the United States since January 1, 1982. House Version, supra note 2, at 37-38.
' See 43 CONG. Q., No. 38, at 1859 (Sept. 21, 1985).
J. Vialet, Summary of Hearings Held by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittees on Im-
migration and Refugee Policy, July 1981-April 1982, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1983) (state-
ment of Ashton Hart, President, National Council of Agricultural Employers).
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If the legislators in joint conference agree to include employer
sanctions and an amnesty provision in the compromise version of
the bill, they must replace illegal workers with legal ones. Both the
Senate and House bills, as introduced, would expand the existing
H-2 temporary worker program and make it easier for farmers to
follow H-2 procedural requirements.8 Both would also establish a
three-year transitional labor program that would phase out the use
of illegal labor.9 Additionally, the Senate bill would establish a sep-
arate program that would allow up to 350,000 nonimmigrants to
enter the United States and work in perishable commodity
industries. 10
Farmers argue that importation of inexpensive foreign workers
keeps food prices down and allows the production of certain crops
to remain in the United States.11 Moreover, they argue that United
States workers generally scorn jobs for which illegal aliens are
hired. 2 Advocates of organized labor argue that "it makes no sense
to bring additional workers to the United States when there are
eight million unemployed [already here]. ' ' 3
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States has implemented guestworker programs in re-
sponse to shortages of unskilled labor on two previous occasions.
The first such program was contained in the Immigration Act of
1917 (1917 Act). 4 Under the 1917 Act, farmers could contract for
8 131 CONG. REC. S11,755 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1985) (§ 122). See 43 CONG. Q., No. 38 at
1859 (Sept. 21, 1985). See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 28
(H-2 workers are aliens admitted temporarily for specific temporary jobs) and 32-41 and
accompanying text (H-2 procedural requirements discussed).
1 131 CONG. REC. S11,755 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1985) (§ 123). See 43 CONG. Q., No. 38, at
1859 (Sept. 21, 1985). See infra notes 65-73 (transitional program discussed).
10 131 CONG. REc. S11,758-61 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1985) (§ 125). See 43 CONG. Q., No. 38, at
1859 (Sept. 21, 1985).
I lnfra note 49.
" Infra note 64.
N.Y. Times, May 11, 1981, at B-8, col. 3 (quoting the National Committee for Full
Employment). See also Immigration Reform and Control Act: Hearings on S. 529 Before
the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
139 (1983) (statement of Althea T.L. Simmons, Director, Washington Bureau of the
N.A.A.C.P.) [hereinafter cited as Judiciary Hearings].
11 Hewlett, Coping with Illegal Immigrants, 60 FoR AFFAIRS 358, 368 (1981-82). "[This
temporary worker] program was a response to strong pressure from the large agricultural
employers of the Southwest who wanted to maintain a cheap labor force." Id. The labor
shortage resulted from newly tightened immigration standards and the flow of domestic
manpower into the military. Alien workers were restricted to "agricultural pursuits, mainte-
nance of way on railroads, or lignite coal mining." However, within these fields they were
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alien workers who would be admitted for up to six months at a
time. 5 To prevent adverse effects on domestic workers, the provi-
sions required employers to show that no United States workers
were available for the jobs. The 1917 Act also required employers
to pay the alien's return fare to the port of entry so that workers
would be more likely to return to their homelands at the end of the
employment period.' 6 Unfortunately, this requirement encouraged
employers purposefully to allow laborers to "desert" upon termina-
tion of employment.' 7 Additionally, some workers left their as-
signed jobs for more lucrative industrial jobs. In all, only one-half
of the 76,000 temporary Mexican workers admitted under the 1917
Act ever returned to their homeland.' s
The second guestworker program was implemented in response
to the general shortage of manpower during World War II.' 9
Known as the bracero program, this legislation was later revised by
the Agricultural Act of 1949 (Act of 1949).20 The revision re-
sponded to concerns that the program had failed to protect domes-
tic workers adequately.2' The Act of 1949 update authorized the
Secretary of Labor to recruit and transport Mexican workers to the
United States, provided: (1) that sufficient domestic workers were
not available, despite reasonable efforts to attract them "at wages
and standard hours of work comparable to those offered to foreign
workers," and (2) that the employment of aliens would not ad-
versely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly em-
free to change employers. H.R. REP. No. 115, Part II, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1983). For a
historical perspective on the problems involved in importing foreign labor, see BAKER, THE
PERCY'S OF MISSISSIPPI; POLITICS AND LITERATURE IN THE NEW SOUTH 27-31 (1983).
1" H.R. REP. No. 115, Part II, supra note 14. The term could be renewed for an additional
six months. Id.
16 Id. Employers were also required to pay workers the prevailing wage and to abide by
state or federal labor department standards regarding housing and sanitation. Id.
"' Workers left the farms on which they worked and remained in the United States ille-
gally. Id. This effect was due in part to inadequate enforcement procedures. Id.
" Hewlett, supra note 14. The program was terminated in 1922 because organized labor
contended that it undermined the economic welfare of domestic workers. Id.
1" H.R. REP. No. 115, Part II, supra note 14, at 20-24.
20 Id. During its first phase, 1942-47, the program was similar to the World War I pro-
gram except that it admitted almost four times as many workers. The wartime legislation
lapsed in 1947. Between 1948 and July 12, 1951, when the Act of 1949 was signed into law,
temporary workers were admitted under the provisions of the 1917 Act. Id. at 21, 22.
21 Id. at 22. In March of 1951, President Truman's Commission on Migratory Labor is-
sued a report that revealed the adverse effects of the bracero program on domestic farm
workers' wages. It included the diagram below (see Appendix). Migratory Labor in Ameri-
can Agriculture, Report of the President's Commission on Migratory Labor (1951).
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ployed domestic agricultural workers. 22
In 1961, the bracero program was again revised. Under the revi-
sion, bracero wages were to be no lower than the amount estab-
lished by the Secretary of Labor as the "adverse effect wage
rate. ' 23 Despite these revisions, social welfare and labor groups
heavily criticized the program, claiming that it decreased job op-
portunities for domestic farm workers. Congress responded to such
criticism by terminating the program in 1964.24
Similar European guestworker programs have sometimes devel-
oped into de facto immigration programs. They have so developed
despite the fact that few of the immigrants involved initially in-
tended a long stay abroad.2 5 Moreover, the permanence developed
despite explicit policies in some of the host countries to avoid per-
manent immigration. 26 As a result of the permanence of the migra-
tions, these European programs proved ineffective to fill the long-
term demands for labor. As the children of migrant workers were
assimilated into the host country, they began to shun the menial
22 H. R. REP. No. 115, Part II, supra note 14, at 22, 23.
13 R. CRAIG, THE BRACERO PROGRAM: INTEREST GROUPS AND FOREIGN POLICY 177 (1971). In
addition, braceros, the workers admitted under the program of the same name, were permit-
ted to remain in the United States for no more than six months (nine months in special
circumstances). Occupational insurance benefits for braceros were also increased, and "de-
tailed criteria were included to govern the removal of braceros involved in strikes or lock-
outs." Id.
24 H.R. REP. No. 115, Part II, supra note 14, at 23. In addition, a report issued in 1959 by
a committee appointed by the Secretary of Labor criticized the program's adverse effects on
domestic farm laborers. Id. Cf. H.R. 722, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1143, 1154 (indicates that United States farm wages rose during
the years of the bracero program). The bracero program has since been criticized on the
grounds that it depressed wage levels and led to the increased illegal immigration that oc-
curred during the years following its conclusion. The program was said to have made
guestworkers aware of the wide array of economic opportunities available in the United
States. Hewlett, supra note 14, at 368-69. Richard Craig attributes the longevity of the
bracero program, opposed by "superior forces representing the general interest," to the coin-
cidence of the interests of a foreign nation (Mexico) and a vocal domestic minority (farm-
ers). CRAIG, supra note 23, at 203. According to Craig, the effect of the program was, ironi-
cally, to increase the wages of domestic workers. The increases responded to the higher
wages given to temporary Mexican workers at the demand of the Mexican government when
it signed the agreements authorizing the program. Id. at 200-02. See also Uglow, The Con-
stituencies of the Immigraiton Bill, 12 MIGRATION TODAY, No. 2, at 25 (1984).
" S. del Campo, Spain, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRATION IN EUROPE (R. Kline ed.
1979).
20 Martin & Seghall, Illegal Immigration: The Guestworker Option, 28 PUB. POL., No. 2,
at 207, 220 (Spring 1980). "[T]he abstract policy of limited duration work permits fell vic-
tim to employer requests for extensions (to avoid recruitment and training costs), migrant
desires to stay, and the simple humanitarian gesture of not uprooting migrants in order to
import replacements simply because their work permits expired." Id.
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jobs once gladly accepted by their parents.2 7
Currently in the United States, approximately 40,000 temporary
workers are admitted each year under the H-2 provision of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA)."5 The Attorney Gen-
eral has final authority to decide who is to be admitted, but his
decision is usually in accord with the recommendation of the Sec-
retary of Labor. 9 Moreover, the Secretary of Labor presently has
the authority to issue regulations which govern the current H-2
program.3 0 Justice Department Immigration and Nationality Ser-
vice regulations, however, require the Secretary of Labor either: (1)
to certify that qualified domestic workers are not available and
that the admission of the alien worker will not adversely affect
similarly employed United States workers, or (2) to give notice
that such certification cannot be made.3 1
An employer seeking to hire alien laborers under the H-2 pro-
gram must comply with certain procedural requirements. Depart-
ment of Labor (DOL) regulations require such employers to sub-
mit a request for certification eighty days in advance of the date of
need. This provision allows time for a sixty-day recruitment pe-
riod,32 during which the employer must actively participate with
17 Thus, as the elder generation retired, new "temporary" migrants had to be brought into
the country. Id. at 219.
28 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii) (1982). H-2 workers are
nonimmigrant workers admitted temporarily for work which is itself temporary in nature.
The H-2 program differs from earlier programs because it is a permanent part of the law. Id.
H.R. REP. No. 115, Part II, supra note 14 at 25. The World War I and bracero programs, in
contrast, were designed to meet specific manpower shortages. Id. Moreover, the H-2 pro-
gram admits approximately equal numbers of agricultural workers (17,953 in 1981) and non-
agricultural workers (18,153 in 1981). Id. See generally U.S. Employment Service, Division
of Agricultural Certifications, Labor Certifications for Temporary Foreign Agricultural &
Logging Workers (11-2's), 1983 Annual Report [hereinafter cited as 1983 Annual Report]
(detailing the number of workers admitted and their dispersion).
29 H.R. REP. No. 115, Part II, supra note 14 at 26. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
International Labor Affairs, Labor Certification for H-2 Workers, at 1 (unpublished public
information statement issued Dec. 13, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Labor Certification].
:0 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1184(c), 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(3)(i).
1 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(3). The section relating to certification of aliens seeking to pertorm
skilled or unskilled labor is the Immigration and Nationality Act, § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(14). A presumption is created that aliens should not be permitted to enter for the
purpose of performing labor because of the likely harmful impact of their admission on
United States workers. Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974).
" Following the recruitment period, 20 days are allowed for the DOL to render its deci-
sion. 20 C.F.R. § 655.200. See Pedersen & Dahl, Alien Farmworkers and United States
Immigration and Naturalization Laws, 4 AGRICULTURAL L.J. 222, 225 (Summer 1982) (the
authors point out that farmers must predict their labor needs 80 days in advance under the
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the DOL in the recruitment of domestic workers. 3 Typically, the
latter requirement is satisfied if the employer: (1) advertises the
job in a newspaper or journal appropriate to the occupation, and
(2) gives a job order, containing exactly the same offer as will be
made to the alien worker, to the Employment Security Agency.
34
Although the recruitment effort is nominally a national one, it is
generally aimed, in fact, at those areas which historically provide
workers for the occupation involved. 5
An employer's offer to hire an alien must also comply with vari-
ous DOL regulations regarding transportation, housing, insurance,
cost of meals, supplying of tools, term of employment, record keep-
ing, payroll deductions, and guaranteed number of workdays.36
The wage offered must equal or exceed the "adverse effect wage
rate" established by the Secretary of Labor to prevent foreign
workers from underselling domestic ones.3 7 Furthermore, no H-2
workers may begin employment during a strike or labor dispute.3
When a worker is admitted under the H-2 program, he is closely
linked to his employer. The death of an H-2 worker's employer
terminates the worker's visa and the alien must then submit a new
H-2 program).
" A regulation requiring employers to have unsuccessfully advertised a job opportunity
before an application for permanent alien labor certification may be granted was held to
constitute a valid exercise of the Secretary of Labor's inherent authority to promulgate rules
governing administration of the H-2 program. Production Tool Corp. v. Employment &
Training Admin., United States Dep't of Labor, 688 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1982). A neighbor-
hood weekly with a circulation of 92,000 in a limited area of city was not a "newspaper of
general circulation" such as the regulations required. Id. at 1171. The Secretary of Labor
was held to have interpreted correctly the DOL regulations when he denied employment
certification where an employer had not advertised in a professional publication at a place
where potential employees would most likely be found. Morrison & Morrison, Inc. v. Secre-
tary of Labor, 626 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1980). A denial of certification made by the Secretary
of Labor may be reserved if the denial is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law. Shuk Yee Chan v. Regional Manpower Adm'r of
United States Dep't of Labor, 521 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1975).
" 43 Fed. Reg. 10,313 (1978) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 655.200(a) (1981)).
" IRIL, supra note 1, at 1231-32. Labor Certification, supra note 29, at 2. See also S.
SOSNICK, HIRED HANDS: SEASONAL FARM WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 404-05 (1978). A
state farm labor director conceded that his agency routinely refused interstate job orders
because they were intended as mere formalities to fulfill the requirements of the DOL. Id.
36 20 C.F.R. 655.202 (1978).
37 Labor Certification, supra note 29, at 1. 43 Fed. Reg. 10,310 (1978) (explanation of the
methodology used to determine the Adverse Effect Wage Rate) (codified at 20 C.F.R. §
655.0 (1981)). In 1983, Adverse Effect Wage rates ranged from $3.35 to $5.37 per hour, de-
pending upon the type of work and the state. 1983 Annual Report, supra note 28, at 14.
- 8 C.F.R. § 214.2 (11).
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visa petition if he desires to begin working for someone else. 9 Each
petition is valid for no more than one year, although where the
labor certification fails to specify a time period, an alien may ex-
tend his stay to three years if he can obtain a new labor certifica-
tion each year. 0 The current INA provisions make no distinction
between agricultural and nonagricultural employment.4 1
II. THE NEW LEGISLATION
The Senate passed immigration bills resembling the new 1985
legislation in each of the previous two sessions of Congress;42 how-
ever, neither of the previous Senate bills contained a separate
guestworker program for the perishable commodity industry.43 In
contrast, the House of Representatives passed a bill in 1984 similar
to the 1985 Senate bill which did contain a separate guestworker
program.44
At the joint conference on the Immigration and Reform Act of
1984, members from both houses agreed to eliminate the separate
guestworker program contained in the House bill. Disagreements
over funding necessary to implement other provisions of the Act
prevented passage, however.45 Additionally, each of the past four
administrations has considered revisions of the present H-2 pro-
gram, but only the Reagan administration has recommended the
creation of a guestworker program distinct from the existing H-2
provisions.46
39 H.R. REP. No. 115, Part II, supra note 14, at 25. Under the H-2 program as under the
bracero program, the worker's status depends on his employer's goodwill; thus, the worker is
easily exploited. See 130 CONG. REc. H5851 (daily ed. June 14, 1984) (statement of Con-
gressman Miller).
40 H.R. REP. No. 98-115, Part II, supra note 14, at 26.
41 H.R. REP. No. 115, Part I, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1983). The Labor Department regu-
lations, however, do set forth more detailed certification procedures for agricultural employ-
ment (20 C.F.R. § 655.200) than for non-agricultural occupations (20 C.F.R. § 621). H.R.
REP. No. 115, Part II, supra note 14, at 24.
4" O'Neill Blocks Immigration Bill in House, 1983 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 287.
" Telephone conversation with staff member of the Senate Subcommittee on Immigra-
tion and Refugee Policy, October 1984 [hereinafter cited as Subcommittee on Immigration].
" 130 CONG. REc. H6179-H6181 (daily ed. June 20, 1984). See 43 CONG. Q., No. 38, at
1859-60 (discussing the political battle over the separate program).
45 The joint conferees, however, were unable to compromise on the issue of who was to
pay the implementing costs of the bill. Thus, the legislation commonly known as the Simp-
son-Mazzoli bill was never passed. The N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1984, at A16, col. 2.
46 Semler, Temporary Foreign Labor: The Administration's "Guestworker" Proposal, 15
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 642-45 (Dec. 1981). The Reagan administration has recommmended a
pilot program to admit up to 50,000 workers for periods of nine to twelve months. The
workers would be targeted to specific areas and categories of jobs and would be barred from
19851
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The 1985 Senate and House bills both contain provisions to in-
crease the flow of legal nonimmigrant labor into the United
States.47 Generally, such provisions aid United States farmers and
harm domestic labor organizations. The greatest fear of the farm-
ers was that they would have to pay more for labor if sanctions
were imposed on employers who hire illegal aliens.4" Farmers ex-
press this fear in terms of increasing food prices and the loss of
marginal industries to countries where cheap labor is available. 9
They assert that if enough workers are not available during the
harvest season, their crops will simply rot in the fields.50 Domestic
a category if a state level official certified that there was an adequate supply of United
States workers in that category. Workers would be free to change employers but would have
no accffss to welfare, food stamps, or unemployment compensation. Id. Both the Ford and
Carter administrations recommended revisions of the existing H-2 program to improve it as
a means of addressing temporary labor shortages without adversely affecting United States
workers. S. REP. No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-26 (1983). Ashton Hart, president of the
National Council of Agricultural Employers, argued in congressional hearings that 50,000
temporary workers would not meet agricultural needs. Vialet, supra note 7, at 119.
11 See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text (discussing how the flow of legal alien
labor would be increased).
48 The Atlanta Journal, Nov. 27, 1984, at Al, col. 2.
49 Id.; IRIL, supra note 1, at 460. The National Council of Agricultural Employers stated
that it is "very concerned ... over the effect that employer sanctions may have upon the
ability of this nation's farmers to produce food and fiber." Id. "[F]ailure to provide access to
an adequate legal workforce would doubtless result in continued use of undocumented work-
ers, which would undermine our overall objective of improved immigration control. Further-
more, failure to provide access to an adequate legal workforce could result in loss of produc-
tion of some crops to other countries, reducing the nation's self-sufficiency in fresh fruit and
vegetable food production and the positive contribution agriculture makes to our balance of
payments." Id. at 1227-28 (statement of A. James Barnes, General Counsel, United States
Department of Agriculture). See S. WEINTRAUB & S. Ross, THE ILLEGAL ALIEN FROM MEXICO
24 (1980). "[Tlhe supply of illegals 'may well be providing the margin of survival for entire
sectors of the economy' like restraurants, other small businesses, and both small - and large-
scale agriculture, that rely heavily on unskilled labor." Id. (quoting an editorial from the
Wall St. J., June 18, 1976).
Better public policy might be to allow some of those industries relying on cheap labor for
profit to cease to exist or to relocate in other countries. Those industries might then provide
capital in the labor sending-countries that would enable them to buy United States goods.
In addition, relocated industries in developing countries might increase the number of jobs
available in those countries, thus slowing the flow of workers into developed countries. Id.
See also Immigration to the United States: Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Popula-
tion, House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1978) (statements of David North
and Rep. Scheuer) [hereinafter cited as Population Hearings]; Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1982: Hearings Before the Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, House of
Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Census Hearings]; Gary
Hector, The Non-Issue of Immigration, FORTUNE, July 23, 1984, at 92. "It is mostly margi-
nal operators on the sleazy edge of business who depend for profit on the labor of illegal
immigrants paid sweatshop wages." Id.
40 H.R. REP. No. 115, Part II, supra note 14, at 11, 12. Hearings on Proposals to Amend
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labor organizations, on the other hand, stress that an expanded H-
2 program would both take jobs away from United States citizens
and depress wages and working conditions of domestic
employees.5 1
The new Senate and House bills both attempt to replace illegal
workers with legal ones by expanding and revising the existing H-2
program. The current H-2 provisions allow an alien to come "tem-
porarily to the United States to perform temporary services or la-
bor, if unemployed persons capable of performing such service or
labor cannot be found in this country."5 The new legislation
would limit the search for domestic workers to the time and place
the workers were needed. The new language would make it easier
for employers to obtain H-2 workers because employers could show
that no suitable workers were available in the specific area more
the Immigration and Nationality Act: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Labor
Standards of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Labor Hearings]. Vialet, supra note 7, at 119 (testimony of Ashton Hart). The
argument that a temporary worker program will prevent crops from wasting in the field
creates a compelling image. However, it is difficult to believe that farmers would continue to
produce crops year after year knowing that there were insufficient workers to harvest them.
Thus, relatively little food would be wasted in the long run. Moreover, the Senate program
for perishable commodities allows foreign workers to plant and cultivate perishable com-
modities, not merely to harvest them. See infra note 75.
11 Judiciary Hearings, supra note 13, at 522. See generally North & Martin, Nonimmi-
grant Aliens in American Agriculture, SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL LABOR MARKETS IN THE
UNITED STATES 185, 186 (R. Emerson, ed. 1984) (discussing the macroeconomic effects of
temporary worker programs); Hector, supra note 49, at 92 (quoting Vernon Briggs, a labor
economist at Cornell University). "I don't believe there is any foreseeable shortage of un-
skilled workers in the U.S. If workers aren't available, then the wage rates may go up and
others workers will come into the market." Id. U.S. Department of Labor, Special Review
Staff, Review of the Rural Manpower Service, mimeographed (Washington, D.C., Apr.
1972), at 58-59, in Sosnick, supra note 35, at 400. A DOL study found that wages offered in
areas where foreign workers are utilized were lower than the national average. Id. Some jobs
may be created for United States citizens by the presence of a cheap labor force. Population
Hearings, supra note 49, at 58-61.
52 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii) (1982).
51 S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 122, 131 CONG. REc. S11,755 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1985).
A petition to import an alien as a temporary agricultural worker ... may not
be approved by the Attorney General unless the petitioner has applied to the Sec-
retary of Labor for a certification that -
(A) there are not sufficient eligible individuals who are able, willing, and quali-
fied and who will be available at the time and place needed to perform the ser-
vices involved in the petition, and
(B) the employment of the alien in such services will not adversely affect the
wages and working conditions of the eligible individuals in the United States simi-
larly employed.
Id. The House version contains a similar provision. H.R. 3080, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 65-66
(Title III, Pt. A, § 301).
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easily than they could show that none were available in the entire
United States. 4
Four other provisions would also make it easier for farmers to
obtain H-2 workers. First, the legislation would give final authority
for promulgating the regulations that would govern the H-2 pro-
gram to the Attorney General.5 The Attorney General regulations,
as compared with the DOL regulations that currently govern the
program, would likely be less biased toward labor interests .5  Sec-
ond, the new legislation would allow a foreign worker already in
the country to remain in the country for brief periods to search for
a new job, in the event that he completed the job that he initially
had been admitted to perform.5 7 Third, the new bills would reduce
the period employers are required to wait for certification of for-
eign workers. 58 Finally, the 1985 legislation would allow employers
to import foreign workers under various seventy-two-hour emer-
gency provisions.5 9 In some cases these emergency provisions would
effectively eliminate the requirement that domestic farmworkers
be recruited before foreign workers could be hired.60
" A similar locality test is already set forth at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14), but that section is
subject to the restrictions of § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii).
"1 7. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 122, 131 CONG. REc. S11,757 (daily ed.) (Sept. 19, 1985).
H.R. 3080, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301, at 73.
Telephone conversation with staff member of the United States Department of Labor
(November 1984) [hereinafter cited as Department of Labor].
5 S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 122, 131 CONG. REc. S11,756 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1985).
Conversation with Gene Pugliese, Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International
Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Oct. 4, 1985 [hereinafter
cited as Pugliese, Conversation]. Under the current law employers must request workers by
petition and the workers must return home upon completion of their work for the petition-
ing employer.
" The waiting period would be reduced from 80 to 65 days under the Senate bill. S. 1200,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 122, 131 CONG. REC. S11,755 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1985). The House bill
would reduce the waiting period to 60 days. H.R. 3080, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301, at 68.
Pugliese, Conversation, supra note 57.
69 131 CONG. Rac. S11,756 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1985) (Q 122). H.R. 3080, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 301, at 70-71. See also Interpreter Releases, Sept. 21, 1984, at 733 (discussing similar
provisions in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1984).
" Senate Subcommittee on Immigration, supra note 43. An employer would have been
able to obtain certification for alien farmworkers within 72 hours if he could show that he
had a need that could not be fulfilled by domestic workers and which could not have been
foreseen in light of his historic needs. Id. Employers would also be able to request 72-hour
certification in the event that recruited domestic workers did not show up on the date they
were to begin work or if the workers proved unqualified for the job. Id. The Secretary of
Labor would also have been required to provide an expedited procedure for review of a
denial, which would guarantee employers an answer within 72 hours. Id. Finally, employers
would have been able to appeal a denial by the Secretary of Labor to the Attorney General.
Id. See also Higgins, The Immigration Reform and Control Act H.R. 1510, 12 MIGRATION
680
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Opponents of the expansion of the H-2 program object to its po-
tentially negative effect on domestic farm workers' wages and
working conditions. 1 They argue that guestworker programs are
"subsidies for U.S. agribusiness at the expense of the country's
farm workers." 2 The underlying assumption of this objection is
that there are citizens or permanent residents who would accept
the jobs if the wages were high enough.6 3 However, farmers argue
that not enough qualified domestic workers exist who want jobs as
migrant stoop laborers despite the fair wages offered.6 4 One stu-
TODAY, No. 3 at 37 (discussing similar provisions in the 1984 Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act). The 72-hour provisions could lead to less planning by farmers. See Id. (explaining
that farmers would tend to forego efforts to plan ahead if they knew they could get the
workers they needed by claiming an emergency situation).
61 Judiciary Hearings, supra note 13, at 514-15, 517-20 (discussion of United States labor
market conditions between AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland, and Senator Simpson); Vi-
alet, supra note 7, at 123. "According to Cesar Chavez, the President of the United
Farmworkers, AFL-CIO, any temporary worker program, including the existing H-2 pro-
gram, delays and defeats organizing attempts and thereby harms all agricultural workers."
Id. (statement of Stephanie Bower, United Farmworkers).
" Vialet, supra note 7, at 124 (statement of Jesus Romo, Director, Farmworker Rights
Organization). Pedersen & Dahl, supra note 32, at 240, 246. H-2 workers may be cheaper
than domestic workers because employers do not have to pay social security, disability, in-
come, and unemployment taxes on H-2 workers under current law. Id.
6' Vialet, supra note 7, at 124. Higher wages would attract rural minority youth and un-
employed union workers, among others, into agriculture. See Id. (response of Ms. Bower to
a question from Senator Simpson); 129 CONG. REC. S6799 (daily ed. May 17, 1983) (Memo-
randum from the AFL-CIO); Fauriol, U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest,
44 THE HUMANIST, No. 3, at 11 (May/June 1984). A 1979 San Diego County study found
that 60% to 80% of illegal immigrants were holding jobs (7% to 8% in agricultural work)
that United States workers would accept. "The Illinois Department of Labor had no trouble
filling openings left after Immigration and Naturalization Service agents arrested 69 workers
earning between $3.50 to $14.00 per hour." Id.; see also Sosnick, supra note 35, at 394.
"Americans have done and continue to do many forms of stoop labor .... cleaning out
sewers and cess pools, digging coal lying on one's side ... these and many others are un-
pleasant forms of work that are performed by men who seek such jobs .... It is unlikely
that they prefer the work itself, but rather the rewards . . . there is a supply of urban labor
that can be drawn into farm labor work . . . . The jobs themselves must be more [finan-
cially] rewarding." Id. (citing Fred H. Schmidt, After the Bracero, mimeographed (Los An-
geles: UCLA Institute of Industrial Relations, 1964), at 25, 27, 28, 127, 131). See generally
id. at 215-16. Growers may overstate their need for workers, thus protecting themselves
against a shortage of hands when the crop is ready to be harvested. Id.; see also North &
Martin, supra note 51, at 168-93. The authors suggest that alien labor availability should be
made contingent upon unemployment rates in the relevant work force, or alternatively, that
there should be a variable tariff on alien workers based upon the rate of unemployment. Id.;
Census Hearings, supra note 49, at 49. A list of 14 United States cities and the number of
unemployed farm workers in each shows that United States workers are available. Id. (state-
ment of Bert Corona, National Coalition of Latin American Trade Unionists, reading a
memorandum prepared by Stephanie Bower, AFL-CIO).
" Labor Hearings, supra note 50, at 22. "We have recruited thousands of domestic work-
ers for our 200 jobs. However, U.S. workers have rarely worked more than a few days out of
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dent of the bracero program points out that it is unfair to require
farmers to accept certain domestic workers merely because the
workers are unable to perform nonagricultural work satisfac-
torily.6
In light of these competing arguments, the drafters of the new
legislation in both houses sought compromise. Thus, both bills con-
tain provisions designed to protect the jobs of the domestic work-
ers. User fees would increase the cost of hiring alien laborers.6s In
addition, employers who do not give preference to United States
workers would be excluded from the program for at least one
year. 7  Finally, monitoring and reporting requirements are
designed to detect any adverse effects on domestic workers.6 8 To-
gether, these provisions might reduce, though not eliminate, the
displacement of domestic workers caused by the influx of large
numbers of temporary workers.
In addition to expanding and revising the existing H-2 program,
legislators hope to provide a sufficient number of workers to farm-
ers through a three-year agricultural labor transitional program. 9
During the first year of the program, an agricultural employer
our nine-month season. Ninety percent of the U.S. workers we hired in one season worked
10 days or less. Our wages are good. Our workplace is governed by a union contract with
extensive benefits. We are monitored on a daily basis by government officials." Id. IRIL,
supra note 1, at 490. Following border patrols raids in southern California, growers at-
tempted to hire domestic workers for $5.00 to $10.00 per hour. Most employees hired quit
after only a few hours. Id. (statement of John Norton, Chairman of the Executive Commit-
tee, United Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Association). In the citrus industry near Phoenix,
during 1981, 90% of the 1100 U.S. workers hired worked less than 11 days, despite the
following conditions: an average hourly wage of $6.50 under a union contract; free housing;
prepared meals at 30% below cost; transportation reimbursement; and a major medical
plan. The citrus industry in Arizona has a 10-month season. Id. at 549 (statement of Russell
Williams, President, Agricultural Producers).
65 The argument is that domestic workers turn to stoop labor as a last resort. Thus usu-
ally only the least qualified workers accept such jobs. R. Hancock, THE ROLE OF THE
BRACERO IN THE ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL DYNAMICS OF MExIco, at 128 (Hispanic American
Studies, Stanford University, 1959).
" S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 122, 131 CONG. REc. S11,755 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1985).
H.R. 3080, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 67 (§ 301).
(House version).
,7 S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 122, 131 CONG. REC. S11,755 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1985)
(one year under the Senate version). H.R. 3080, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 67-68 (§ 301) (three
years under the House version).
S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 124, 131 CONG. REC. S11,757-58 (daily ed. Sept. 19,
1985). H.R. 3080, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401, at 84-85.
69 S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 123, 131 CONG. REC. S11,757 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1985).
H.R. 3080, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302, at 74-76. See also INTERPRETER RELEASES, 26 Sept.




could apply to the Attorney General for certification to hire up to
100 percent of "his nondomestic seasonal agricultural need. '70 In
the second and third years of the program, the Attorney General
would reduce the number of work permits originally granted by
one-third the amount of the first-year grant.71 Only aliens who are
already present in the United States would be eligible for certifica-
tion under the transitional program.72 As with the H-2 program,
aliens would be authorized for admission only to the extent that
they would not adversely affect domestic workers' opportunities.73
The transitional program may be viewed as a compromise. On
the one hand, it recognizes the need to provide more jobs for legal
workers, both domestic and nonimmigrant. On the other hand, the
program recognizes the need to allow employers and illegal workers
sufficient time to adjust to the changes resulting from employer
sanctions and the amnesty provision. Under the transitional pro-
gram, legal workers would replace illegals gradually over a three-
year period. The wages and working conditions of legal workers in
the United States will likely improve as illegals are excluded from
the labor market.74
In addition to the revisions of the H-2 program and the transi-
tional program, both contained in the legislation introduced in the
House of Representatives, the Senate bill also contains a separate
guestworker program that would admit up to 350,000 nonimmi-
grants at any one time to work in perishable commodity indus-




" See supra notes 51 and 63 and accompanying text. If the new legislation included a
transitional program, employer sanctions, and an amnesty provision, without expanding the
H-2 program and without adding a separate program for perishable commodity workers,
domestic workers would be the primary beneficiaries of the improved working conditions
and wages. Other possible results of such legislation would be: increased automation in
United States industries, reducing the need for labor; relocation of industry abroad, where
cheap labor is available; or the demise of industries dependent on cheap labor for profit. Id.
See Protes and Kincaid, Alternative Outcomes on Reform, 22 SOCIETY, No. 4, 73, 75 (May-
June 1985). Thus, the arguments in favor of legislation with no changes in guestworker pro-
visions other than the addition of a transitional program would be: (1) improved conditions
for United States workers; (2) increased efficiency of industry through automation; and (3)
more intelligent allocation of domestic resources. The use of large numbers of alien workers
in United States industries may be viewed as a distortion of the national economy. Employ-
ers reap the benefits of operating in the United States, the use of public services, without
fully paying the costs associated with their business activities, that is, without providing
jobs to domestic workers.
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tries.75 Each worker would be allowed to remain in the United
States for up to nine months in any calendar year and could move
freely between employers in a given region as needs change.7 6 The
seasonal workers would be limited to "planting, cultural practices,
production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting involving perisha-
ble commodities (as defined by the Secretary of Agriculture)."'
The Attorney General would establish standards for wages and
working conditions to prevent the presence of the foreign workers
from adversely affecting domestic workers' wages and conditions.78
Employers would pay a sum equivalent to eleven percent of each
employee's wages into a trust fund that would be used to adminis-
ter the program. Workers would have twenty percent of their
wages deducted and placed into the trust fund.79 Workers could
reclaim those deductions after they had returned to their home-
land, so long as they as they had complied with the terms and con-
ditions of the program, including the obligation to be continuously
employed or seeking employment. 80 The program would automati-
cally terminate after three years unless both houses pass a resolu-
tion in support of its continuance.81
III. CONCLUSIONS
The generous temporary worker provisions in the Senate bill
would provide farmers with sufficient numbers of legal foreign
workers to replace illegal workers excluded by the provisions pun-
ishing employers who hire illegal aliens. The bill would increase
the government's control over the aliens who inevitably enter to
work on United States farms.82 Additionally, it would generate new
respect for United States immigration laws by legitimizing the use
of foreign workers.83 Moreover, the legislation would eliminate the
need for a farm labor black market since farmers could hire cheap
labor legally.
71 S. 1200, 131 CONG. REC. S11,758-61 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1985) (§ 125). 43 CoNG. Q., No.
38, at 1861 (Sept. 21, 1985).






" Fauriol, supra note 63, at 12.
3 Fauriol, supra note 63, at 6.




The big winner under the Senate program is the United States
farmer. He wins a permanent supply of experienced and inexpen-
sive laborers.8 5 But he gains at the expense of domestic workers
who will inevitably suffer some erosion of wages and working con-
ditions as foreign competitors enter the labor market.8 6 Arguably,
the importation of foreign workers will save industries and thus
save domestic workers' jobs as well.87 However, industries depen-
dent on cheap labor as a source of profit do not always exploit re-
sources wisely. Perhaps more jobs could be created by cutting off
the source of cheap labor, thus forcing such inefficient industries to
cease operations and encouraging more efficient industries to
grow.88
Moreover, experience with the bracero program suggests that a
large guestworker program will not improve Mexico's economy in
the long run.89 Likewise, the individual nonimmigrant worker may
not gain permanently from a program that raises his expectations
without guaranteeing him work every year. Even when he is able to
participate in the program, the guestworker is treated unfairly, is
under-paid, and is removed from his family for extended periods.90
Finally, aliens may use an expanded H-2 program as a backdoor to
permanent immigration9' and thus aggravate the problems associ-
ated with a large population of immigrants.92
The above problems, which are generally associated with large
88 The temporary workers admitted from abroad would likely be the same individuals
previously crossing the border to work illegally before passage of the bill.
" IRIL, supra note 1, at 529. See Fauriol, supra note 63, at 12. For every one million
domestic workers displaced by illegal aliens (or presumably by temporary legal ones) the
United States Treasury loses an estimated $7 billion per year in transfer payments. Id.
87 Bean & Sullivan, Confronting the Problem, 22 SOCIETY, No. 4, 67, 71 (May-June, 1985).
" WEINTRAUB & Ross, supra note 49, at 24; see also Census Hearings, supra note 49, at
65; Fauriol, supra note 63, at 6 (citing Garcia, Stopping Illegal Immigration at its Source,
Christ. Sci. Mon., Nov. 8, 1982). The author suggests that the best method of controlling
illegal immigration into the United States is to improve conditions in the sending countries.
This alternative might create political stability in the sending countries and markets for
United States goods and services in those countries. Id.
89 Although Mexico received over $100,000,000 per year in wages sent home by workers
while the bracero program was in operation, Hancock, supra note 65, at 7, Mexico will likely
not benefit from increased economic dependence on the United States. Id. at 76.
" Hancock, supra note 65 at 38-39, 122. See Miller, Reflection on Simpson-Mazzoli in
Conference: Panettacitis, 12 MIGRATION TODAY, No. 3, at 37 (1984).
IRIL, supra note 1, at 1222.
9 Those problems include a permanent class of unskilled, unemployed workers and the
growing use of ethnic power blocs in the United States. Fauriol, supra note 63, at 7. See
generally R. Weist, MEXICAN FARM LABORERS IN CALIFORNIA A STUDY OF INTRAGROUP SOCIAL
RELATIONS (1977) (discussing conditions among Mexican workers in the United States).
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temporary worker programs, should be avoided by limiting the ex-
pansion of the guestworker programs. The best immigration bill
that could emerge from the Ninety-Ninth Congress would seek to
provide farmers with a sufficient number of laborers and limit the
adverse effect of the admission of foreign workers into the United
States upon domestic workers' wages and working conditions.
These goals might be achieved by either: (1) expanding the agricul-
tural portion of the H-2 program and not including a separate pro-
gram for the perishable commodity industry,9" or (2) maintaining
the present H-2 program and adding the Senate's perishable com-
modity program.
Both alternatives recognize arguments of the farm employer and
the domestic worker. Alien workers would take jobs that domestic
workers prefer to avoid; that is, manual labor jobs on farms.9 ' Most
of the foreign workers admitted would not be competing directly
with urban minority workers, who are the most vulnerable to ad-
verse labor conditions."5
By providing jobs for foreign workers, this legislation would im-
prove living conditions for hundreds of thousands of deserving in-
dividuals.96 To the extent that visiting workers save their wages,
they might invest in capital improvements in their homelands,
thereby improving living conditions. 7 The money workers send
home to their families would stimulate the economies of the coun-
tries from which they emigrated.98 Visiting workers might also re-
turn to their homelands with new skills or agricultural techniques
that might also improve conditions there.99 Additionally, the pro-
gram would probably improve relations between the United States
and Mexico. Mexico needs jobs for its citizens, and the United
States might obtain improved access to Mexican oil reserves by
" The House bill would employ this method.
Supra note 68.
96 Department of Labor, supra note 56.
See generally Hancock, supra note 65, at 122-24. The author argues that temporary
work abroad can make farm workers more self-reliant, give them access to long needed med-
ical attention, and make them more economically ambitious. But the latter, he points out,
might contribute to social unrest upon the workers' return to their homes. Id. See also 154
AMERICA 461 (June 8, 1985) (editorial quoting The Wall Street Journal without identifying
from which issue it takes the quotation).
97 Martin, The Economic Effects of Temporary Worker Migration, 13 MIGRATION TODAY,
21, 26 (May 1985).




supplying those jobs.110 Moreover, by providing a safety valve for
Mexico's excess supply of workers and by creating a flow of income
into that country, the Senate program would promote economic
and political stability there.101
The expanded H-2 provisions in the House or Senate bill, or the
Senate perishable commodity program alone, combined with the
existing H-2 nonagricultural provisions, would provide enough le-
gal workers to satisfy the needs of United States employers.0 2 In
1984, both houses agreed to eliminate a separate program for the
perishable commodity industry from the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1984.'03 The House should again resist the powerful
farm lobby and reject a separate program for the perishable com-
modity industry on the grounds that it would be duplicative and
excessive. 104 The separate Senate program could then be omitted
in Joint conference on the legislation.
Andrew W. Baker
100 See IRIL, supra note 1, at 561; Pedersen & Dahl, supra note 32, at 237; 31 THE
WORLD PRESS REVIEW, No. 8, at 23 (citing The Excelsior, June 19, 1984, and El Universal,
June 21, 1984).
1'0 See supra note 100. The United States has a natural interest in the political and eco-
nomic stability of its geographic neighbors.
'02 For example, nonagricultural H-2 workers could be used by employers in the so-called
"Silicon Valley" area of California or in the garment district in New York, where domestic
workers are difficult to find. Portes & Kincaid, supra note 74, at 75.
o' N.Y. Times, supra note 45.
'o Subcommittee on Immigration, supra note 43.
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APPENDIX
CHANGES IN AVERAGE WAGES FOR COTTON PICKING
War and Post-War Employment of Mexican Contract Labor Chart VII
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